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The power(lessness) of New Zealand’s House of Representatives to 
summons the Crown’s legal advice 
 
The extent of the New Zealand’s House of Representatives’ (“the House’s”) general 
power to summons persons and documents recently came into question. A 
parliamentary committee, established to scrutinise the government’s response to the 
COVID-19 epidemic, required that various officials provide it with the Crown’s legal 
advice regarding the very extensive restrictions placed upon New Zealand society. 
When the Attorney-General objected on the basis that the documents sought were 
protected by legal professional privilege, the Speaker of the House determined that 
the House has no power to demand their production. Although this decision was 
based on precedent, it differs from the position in the United Kingdom’s House of 
Commons (“the Commons”) from whence the House derives its privileges. It also 
is questionable whether it is a desirable outcome in terms of New Zealand’s 
constitution. 
 
Legal questions regarding New Zealand’s COVID-19 response 
 
In legal terms, New Zealand’s “lockdown response” to COVID-19 “was effected by 
interwoven layers of various ordinary and emergency powers”.1 However, whether 
those powers actually permitted the restrictions imposed on individuals became a 
matter of ongoing debate.2 The lockdown response’s initial legal basis may not have 
provided sufficient authority for the police to enforce all of the publicly proclaimed 
rules.3 When the Government promulgated an additional legal notice to confer such 
authority, a further question arose as to whether this notice was ultra vires the 
 
1 D Knight, “Lockdown Bubbles through Layers of Law, Discretion and Nudges – New 
Zealand” Verfassungblog (7 April 2020) (https://verfassungsblog.de/covid-19-in-new-zealand-
lockdown-bubbles-through-layers-of-law-discretion-and-nudges/). 
2 Compare A Geddis and C Geiringer, “Is New Zealand’s COVID-19 Lockdown Lawful?” U.K. 
Const. L. Blog (27 April 2020) (https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2020/04/27/andrew-geddis-and-
claudia-geiringer-is-new-zealands-covid-19-lockdown-lawful/), with D Knight and G McLay, “Is 
New Zealand’s COVID-19 Lockdown Lawful? – An Alternative View” U.K. Const. L. Blog (11 
May 2020) (https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2020/05/11/dean-r-knight-and-geoff-mclay-is-
new-zealands-covid-19-lockdown-lawful-an-alternative-view/). See also Nottingham v Ardern 
[2020] NZCA 144 at [28] (“... there are unresolved questions about the lawfulness of the notices 
issued under s 70 of the Health Act.”) 




statutory provision relied on to give it legal force. At the time of writing, these 
questions remain the subject of a judicial review proceeding in the High Court.4 
In light of these legal uncertainties, parliamentarians also sought to explore the 
lockdown response’s foundation. They did so through the Epidemic Response 
Committee (“the Committee”), a select committee of the House established before 
New Zealand went into lockdown. With the House unable to sit during this period, 
the Committee was tasked with “consider[ing] and report[ing] to the House on 
matters relating to the Government’s management of the COVID-19 epidemic.”5 
Two features of the Committee are of particular importance. First, it was chaired by 
the leader of the opposition and had a majority of opposition MPs as members. 
Second, the House’s resolution establishing the Committee granted it the power to 
summons witnesses and documents. 
The Committee’s opposition majority then purported to exercise this power by 
summonsing documents from the Solicitor-General, the Director-General of 
Health, and the Police Commissioner containing legal advice regarding the 
lockdown response.6 The Attorney-General opposed this move, claiming that the 
documents in question were legally privileged. He instead requested that the Speaker 
of the House refer the matter to the House’s Privileges Committee for an inquiry. 
However, the Speaker provided his response in a letter to the Attorney-General:7 
… The Epidemic Response Committee has not, through a summons, 
attempted to override legal professional privilege, as it is possible for a waiver 
of legal professional privilege either to be granted or refused. It is recognised 
by the House that legal professional privilege may be a legitimate basis for 
refusing a request for legal advice, but that does not prevent the request—or 
a summons—from being made. I therefore do not consider that the matter 
you have raised involves a question of privilege at this stage. 
In 1875 Speaker Bell ruled that committees did not have the power to order 
the production of legal opinion of the Law Officer because the House did not 
possess that power. This position was modified by the Standing Orders 
committee, in its 2003 report, stated [sic] that it is in order for committees to 
request the provision of legal advice that already exists but that a legal opinion 
is the property of the person who commissioned it and that, without that 
person’s consent, a committee cannot expect an opinion to be furnished by 
the person who prepared it. In this instance, there is a further requirement 
 
4 See Borrowdale v Director General of Health [2020] NZCA 156.  
5 (25 March 2020) 745 NZPD 17316. 
6 J Gligorijević, ‘Government Accountability for the Lawfulness of Lockdown: New Zealand 
Parliamentary Scrutiny and Privileged Legal Advice’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (11th May 2020) 
(https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2020/05/11/jelena-gligorijevic-government-accountability-for-
the-lawfulness-of-lockdown-new-zealand-parliamentary-scrutiny-and-privileged-legal-advice/). 
7 Letter from Rt Hon Trevor Mallard to Hon David Parker (12 May 2020). 
that you waive legal professional privilege and approve the provision of the 
documents.  
With no live question for the Privileges Committee to inquire into, and the Epidemic 
Response Committee being disestablished shortly thereafter,8 the question of 
whether this decision is correct is largely unresolved. This comment seeks to advance 
the discussion. 
 
The House’s power to summons the Crown’s legal advice  
 
The House of Representative’s power to summons individuals and documents is 
sourced in the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 (NZ), s 8(1), which confers upon the 
New Zealand legislature every “privilege, immunity, or power” that the UK House 
of Commons possessed on 1 January, 1865. Two such historical privileges are the 
power to inquire and the power of compulsion to obtain information. McGee’s 
Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand summarises their relationship as follows:9 
The power of the House to inquire into anything that it sees fit has long been 
held to imply a concomitant power of compulsion to obtain information 
necessary to carry out an inquiry. These powers—the power to inquire and 
the power to obtain evidence coercively—have often been regarded as 
synonymous. However … it is not always the case that a body with a power 
to inquire also possesses a power to order production of evidence. It is 
preferable, therefore, to regard these as separate powers. The power to secure 
evidence by requiring the attendance of witnesses and the production of 
documents is viewed as supporting the power to inquire, and is usually (but 
not always) co-extensive with it. 
McGee also notes that the power of compulsion to obtain information may be 
delegated by the House to Committee. Because the House’s resolution creating the 
Committee specifically authorised it to send for persons, papers, and records,10 the 
House’s standing orders permitted the Committee to “order that a summons be 
issued to any person … to produce papers and records in that person’s possession, 
custody or control … .”11 But standing orders do not answer the question as to 
whether the House (and by extension, its committees) has the power to require 
production of government documents protected by legal professional privilege.  
 
8 (2 June 2020) 746 NZPD (Business of Select Committees – Epidemic Response Committee). 
9 D McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, (4th ed., 2017), 494  
10 (25 March 2020) 745 NZPD 17316. 
11 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives (2017), SO 196. 
Given that the New Zealand House’s powers derive from those historically held by 
the Commons, that answer might be thought to lie in the practices of Westminster. 
As Erskine May records:12  
By long-standing convention, observed by successive Governments, the fact 
of, and substance of advice from, the law officers of the Crown is not 
disclosed outside government. … The purpose of this convention is to enable 
the Government to obtain frank and full legal advice in confidence. 
Therefore, the opinions of the law officers of the Crown, being confidential, 
are not usually laid before Parliament, cited in debate or provided in evidence 
before a select committee, and their production has frequently been refused; 
but if a Minister deems it expedient that such opinions should be made known 
for the information of the House, the Speaker has ruled that the rules of the 
House are in no way involved.  
However, recent events around Brexit demonstrate that this “long-standing 
convention” does not preclude the Commons from demanding the disclosure of 
such advice.13 In November of 2018, the Commons adopted a resolution requiring 
the production of “any legal advice in full, including that provided by the Attorney 
General, on the proposed withdrawal agreement on the terms of the UK’s departure 
from the European Union … .”14 When the Government refused to comply,  the 
Commons adopted a further motion finding Ministers in contempt.15 The 
Government then published the material the following day. 
No substantive law changes between 1865 and 2018 have created a new summonsing 
power for the Commons. Consequently, as the Commons must have possessed such 
a power in 1865 for it to be exercisable in 2018, the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 
(NZ), s 8(1) confers it upon the House. However, that is not how the House itself 
has understood its powers. In 1875, its Public Petitions Committee considered a 
petition in relation to a land grant made in Wanganui for an industrial school. 
Importantly, the debate was over a motion in the following form:16 
Motion made, and question proposed, “That it is desirable that the Public 
Petitions Committee should be furnished with a copy of the Attorney 
General’s opinion on the case of the Wanganui Industrial School Grant.”—
(Mr. T. Kelly.) 
 
12 Erskine May’s treatise of the law, privileges, proceedings and usage of Parliament (25th ed, 2019), para 
21.27. 
13 G Murphy, “Time to waive LPP on government legal advice in the UK” (2018) 44 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin 311. 
14 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmvote/181113v01.pdf   
15 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmvote/181204v01.pdf  
16 (30 September 1875) 18 NZPD 94.  
This is not a motion like that in the Commons in 2018, which required production 
of the relevant legal advice. It is more in the nature of a request, with Hansard 
recording the following exchange with the Speaker:17 
Mr. MACANDREW asked if the Committee had exercised due diligence, and 
used the power with which it was invested, to call for persons, papers, and 
reports. In this case it appeared to him that the Committee had ample power 
to call for papers. 
Mr. SPEAKER said the Committee had not the power to order papers which 
the House could not order to be produced. The House could not order 
official opinions of the Law Officer to be produced, and therefore the 
Committee could not. 
Although the House voted in favour of Mr Kelly’s request and the motion recording 
the view of the House that the opinion’s production was “desirable”, the Speaker’s 
ruling during the debate nevertheless stood. It held that the House lacks the power 
to direct that the official opinion of a Law Officer be produced. And as the House 
lacks this power, then the Committee could not exercise it.  
Of course, in light of the United Kingdom’s more recent experience, it is 
questionable whether the 1875 ruling accurately reflects the privileges of the 
Commons at 1865 or since. The Speaker may have confused a “long standing 
convention” that the Crown’s legal advice will not be given to parliamentarians with 
an absence of a power to require such advice be presented if thought necessary. 
Alternatively, it may be that by treating a failure to comply with its demand to receive 
the Crown’s legal advice as a contempt, the Commons in 2018 asserted a power of 
compulsion to obtain information that it actually does not possess in law. In either 
case, these twin events have exposed a disjunct between two systems where the law 
on this aspect of parliamentary privilege theoretically ought to be the same. That 
then raises the question as to which approach is the more desirable one to have in 
place. 
 
Should the House be able to summons Crown legal advice?  
 
Legal professional privilege is a common law principle, which exists for good reason. 
In a Facebook Live speech explaining why he opposed the Committee’s summons 
of the Crown’s advice, the Attorney-General summarised its purpose as being:18 
 
17 (30 September 1875) 18 NZPD 94. 
18 Hon D Parker, “New Zealand’s Covid-19 response – legal underpinnings and legal privilege”, 
8 May 2020 (https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/new-zealand’s-covid-19-response-legal-
underpinnings-and-legal-privilege).    
to enable legal advice to be sought and given in confidence. The basic 
principles arise from the public interest requiring full and frank exchange of 
confidence between solicitor and client to enable the client to receive 
necessary legal advice.  It is a necessary corollary to the right of any person to 
obtain skilled advice about the law. People must be able to consult their 
lawyers in absolute confidence, as otherwise they might hold back 
information, in fear it may afterwards be disclosed and used to their prejudice.  
Where the “client” involved is the Crown, in the form of government ministers and 
their officials, further separation of powers considerations arise. Making policy 
decisions requires good information about the legal risks involved, amongst other 
matters. The legislative branch (or the judicial branch, for that matter) routinely 
interrogating the advice underlying such decisions threatens the efficacy of such 
information. And that in turn risks damaging the basis for good policy making by 
the executive. 
Nevertheless, there are cogent policy arguments that the House still should have the 
power to summons Crown legal advice if it requires such information. After all, 
Parliament already recognises that legal professional privilege should not be a 
complete shield against the release of advice to the Crown. Under the Official 
Information Act 1982 (NZ), s 9(2)(h) the existence of such privilege provides a good 
reason for refusing the release of any official information, but one that must be 
balanced against “other considerations which render it desirable, in the public 
interest, to make that information available.”19 And as Jelena Gligorijević notes:20 
Whereas elsewhere the separation of powers rigidly divides governmental 
power in large part to protect individual liberty from the concentration of 
power in one entity, in New Zealand … it is not so rigid, and not the primary 
means of controlling governmental power and protecting liberty. 
Parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law serve instead as the primary 
mechanisms for such protection. 
Political forms of accountability combined with parliamentary sovereignty then place 
an independent responsibility on the House for ensuring that the executive 
government’s actions are in accordance with the law. The House devolved that 
responsibility to the Committee during the COVID-19 lockdown response, charging 
it to report to the House on action it might wish to take. If the Committee then 
considered that legislative action is required to validate any governmental actions, it 
need not wait for a court to rule that the Government had in fact acted unlawfully. 
 
19 Official Information Act 1982 (NZ), s 9(1). 
20 J Gligorijević, ‘Government Accountability for the Lawfulness of Lockdown: New Zealand 
Parliamentary Scrutiny and Privileged Legal Advice’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (11th May 2020) 
(https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2020/05/11/jelena-gligorijevic-government-accountability-for-
the-lawfulness-of-lockdown-new-zealand-parliamentary-scrutiny-and-privileged-legal-advice/). 
New Zealand’s Parliament passes more validating legislation than we might hope 
necessary. While some of it arises because of court decisions, much of it does not. 
Neither of the occasions Parliament validated the swearing-in of Police officers was 
preceded by a court decision,21 nor were changes to the legislation to validate several 
years of payments to mid-term replacement list MPs.22 Parliament has even validated 
a local authority’s unlawful levying of rates whilst the matter was before the courts.23 
So, it is quite proper for a committee, or Parliament itself, to form its own view of 
the legality of governmental actions and then take the action it thinks appropriate. 
Equally, the legal advice available to ministers when they decided not to request 
Parliament to provide new laws for the lockdown response is relevant to the 
question of whether the House should maintain its confidence in the Government. 
Depending on the nature of that advice, the Government’s decision may have been 
reckless, or may show ministers being insufficiently sceptical of public servants’ 
assertions of power. If that were to be the case, then one option available to the 
Committee’s opposition majority might have been to recommend that the House 
withdraw its confidence from the Government.  
Of course, even if the Committee did recommend this course of action, the 
Government’s majority in the House and a political system with its very strong party 
whip makes it difficult to imagine this recommendation being followed. But the 
thought experiment establishes the principle. The Crown’s legal advice may be 
relevant to the House’s decision on a matter, or relevant to a committee’s business. 
And this is something the House has been clear about since at least 1875. As such, 
there is a strong argument that the House, and any committee that the House 
authorises to do so, ought to be able to require it be given that advice. And if the 
House does indeed currently lack the power to do so, perhaps it should be given it. 
 
Graeme Edgeler, Barrister 
Professor Andrew Geddis, Faculty of Law, University of Otago 
 
21 Policing (Constable’s Oaths Validation) Amendment Act 2009 (NZ); Policing (Constable’s 
Oaths Validation) Amendment Act 2013 (NZ).   
22 Members of Parliament (Remuneration and Services) Act 2013, s 68. 
23 Kaipara District Council (Validation of Rates and Other Matters) Act 2013. See also Mangawhai 
Ratepayers and Residents Association v Kaipara District Council [2015] NZCA 612 at [203] (“[W]e do 
not understand in principle how it can be objectionable for Parliament to pass validating 
legislation having embarked on a full inquiry as to what should occur in the most unfortunate 
circumstances that have arisen and having made what is pre-eminently a political judgment that a 
validating act is the best way to proceed.”) 
